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Against Ahok: An Analysis of Emotion-Driven Movements and Network Power in Jakarta’s 2017 Gubernatorial Election

Subekti W. Priyadharma
Faculty of Communication Science, Padjadjaran University
subekti.w.priyadharma@unpad.ac.id

ABSTRACT
Many Indonesian citizens reacted angrily to part of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama’s, popularly known as Ahok, video uploaded by Buni Yani to his Facebook account on October 6, 2016. The video was taken during a speech in Kepulauan Seribu where Ahok, the Governor of Jakarta, quoted one verse of Al-Qur’an, Surah Al-Maidah verse 51. Some people were filled with outrage because of Ahok’s statement, but some others were angry because, one week prior to now Yani’s infamous Facebook status, Yani added his own ‘frame’ to that clip. In that status, Yani said, with a question mark, that Ahok had defamed the religion of Islam. It caused the polarization of Indonesian civil society: pro-Ahok bloc, who believed that his words were not an insult to the holy scriptures and anti-Ahok bloc, who strongly argued that Ahok, a Christian of Chinese descent and has no Javanese root in his blood – a minority in 3 categories –, had no right to cite Quranic verses and therefore despised Islam. Consequently, he deserved to be criminalized and deposed from his Governor post. Using Affective Intelligence theory and Manuel Castells’ Network Theory of Power, this paper attempts to analyze the character of both anti-Ahok movement and its counter-movement. While affective intelligence theory centers the effect of affection on political behavior, the network theory of power focuses more on how networks empower individuals to act as a collective entity against the dominant power. The materials for this analysis are obtained mainly from the internet.

KEYWORDS: Ahok, social movement, emotion, network, elections, social media

INTRODUCTION
Jakarta’s 2017 gubernatorial election ended dramatically. Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno came out as the winners after the second round, defeated incumbent Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok1 and Djarot Saeful Hidayat with a fairly landslide victory (voting percentage 57.96 vs 42.04, source: KPUD-DKI). This tiring election process attracted public’s attention and was in the spotlight of international media. It was not because of the election per se, but its context that shrouded the election. After the first round of the election, it became a two-horse race battle between two pairs of candidates with two contrasting

1‘Ahok’ will be used throughout this article instead of his real name for the sake of conciseness and popularity.
ideologies that had divided not only the citizens of Jakarta, but also Indonesian citizens outside Jakarta, who did not even have the right to vote, into two supporting blocs: anti- and pro-Ahok. Heated debates and hate speeches between these two groups seemed to continue, especially on the Internet, even after the election was formally over. Internet has become a platform for debate, arguments and sarcasms, fabricated news/hoax as well as sectarian and racist comments. Social media was well known for its mobilization and coordination function within a wide range of social movements (Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street, to name a few).

Ahok’s case was covered in local, national and even international mass media. All narrated the case with their own angles (e.g. defamation, discrimination, minority/majority relation, Islamophobia, Islam and democracy, intolerance, etc.)

As a politician born to an ethnic and religious minority in this country, Ahok is vulnerable to discrimination because of his ethnic status and religious association. While this paper does not specifically discuss gender studies, the issue of discrimination against religious and ethnic minority in Indonesia has become an issue which regains its significance in a country that should uphold the principle of equality, especially since Indonesia is built on a strong pluralistic foundation of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity) slogan. This paper attempts to bring minority group discrimination into the discussion, whether it is gender-based, religion-based or ethnic-based in a predominantly Muslim society where social and political life is strongly influenced by Islamic values. The crisscrossing between Islamic principle, gender issue and political choice was intensified in Indonesian politics during the debate about the justification of a woman becoming a leader in this country (the presidency of Megawati Sukarnoputri, the first Indonesian female president, in 2001 and her candidacy in the 2004 presidential election). Similar challenge is faced by other minority groups such as LGBT group. In this paper, the author argues that the rejection of Muslim majority against attempts for equal rights in daily life and (especially) politics for minority groups is based on fear of violating God’s command (e.g. prohibition to elect woman as a leader or the law of God over LGBT people with reference to the stories of Sodom and Gomorrah). If this situation is not properly addressed by the Government, it can escalate into a movement that is characterized by underlying emotion of fear.


The fall of Ahok from his governor post due to religion blasphemy is an example of how a fear-motivated mass movement can form and meet its success. His political career as the governor of Jakarta lasted for only 2.5 years. But in such a short time, not a few of his political decisions and government policies were deemed controversial despite the breakthroughs. Consequently, those decisions have invited a lot of criticisms as well as support for Ahok, depending on one’s standing point in evaluating his policy.

Starting from his inauguration as the governor on November 19, 2014, Ahok had faced many objections. Among others, refusal came from hardline Islamic groups, represented among others by FPI (Islamic Defenders Front). The reason for their rejection was related to his belief. According to their Tafsir (interpretation) of Islam, Ahok, who is a devoted Christian, is not allowed to be a leader in a Muslim majority country and for Muslim majority community. This interpretation refers to Surah of Al-Maidah verse 51 in the Qur’an that requires Muslims to vote only Muslim candidates and be led by Muslim leaders. Since Ahok had already been inaugurated, the groups even unilaterally appointed a person of their own ranks as a ‘rival’ governor despite having little impact other than just media sensation (cf. Meyer, 2001, pp. 45–56).4

All controversies of Ahok’s policy and politics reached its peak when Buni Yani, an ex-journalist turned academic, uploaded a video of Ahok’s speech on Kepulauan Seribu citing Verse 51 of Surah of Al-Maidah. In that 31-second video clip (from 1 hour 45 minutes of the total duration)5, Ahok said,

*So, don’t believe them, perhaps in your deepest heart you are not allowed to choose me (in the next election), right? You’re deceived using Surah Al-Maidah (Verse) 51, all kinds of it. That’s your right (not to choose me). So, if you feel that (I) cannot be chosen anymore, because ‘I’m afraid of going to hell’ because (you’re) fooled, so yes, I’m okay with it*. (author’s translation)

Controversy arose when Buni Yani misquoted Ahok’s statement on his Facebook status by removing the word “using”. The quotation error that was admitted by Buni Yani at ILC (Indonesian Lawyers Club) on TV One on October 11, 2016 triggered national debate whether Ahok insulted Qur’an (and therefore Islam) or not.

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4 Sub-chapter Die Logik der Massenmedien


It was just one word, but exactly the one that generated public uproar. The omission of the word “using” had a wide impact in terms of interpretation of Ahok’s statement. Some insisted that the presence/absence of the word “using” had no effect on the negative meaning of the sentence because it was juxtaposed with words that implied negative connotation such as “fooled” and “deceived”. This negative interpretation was mirrored in the court’s verdict following the accusation addressed to Ahok.

After MUI (Indonesian Ulema Council) issued a fatwa against Ahok’s statement, massive and systematic social movements in line with the fatwa emerged. Buni Yani’s blasphemy frame (see Figure 1) succeeded in making certain Indonesian Muslim groups mobilize themselves and go on demonstrations in several volumes aiming to drag Ahok before the court. These movements were guided by elements of civil society led by several radical Islamic and nationalist-oriented organizations such as FPI, FUI, and HMI. Together they formed GNPF-MUI (national movement for guarding MUI’s fatwa) that functioned as an umbrella organ for the movement.

A series of demonstrations that claimed to be attended by hundreds of thousands of people took place in Jakarta. The participants were not only residents of Jakarta, but also other cities. Some of them even long marched from other cities located far

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away from Jakarta such as Ciamis. They found solidarity in demonstrations against Ahok and called themselves Aksi Bela Islam or Aksi Bela Al-Qur’an (Action to Defend Islam/the Qur’an). There were at least four of such rallies carried out in the streets of Jakarta: on November 4, 2016 or known as “411”, December 2, 2016 (212), February 11, 2017 (112) and March 31, 2017 (313).

Pro-Ahok group, who rejected Buni Yani’s interpretation’s frame and therefore denied the blasphemy against Qur’an accusation, called for a counter-demonstration (so-called Parade Bhinneka Tunggal Ika) on November 19, 2016. However, despite many supporters who came onto the streets, they failed to match that of GNPF-MUI in terms of quantity, consistency, and resulting effects.

This paper will not provide debates about the diverse interpretations of Quranic verses among Muslims scholars. The purpose of this paper is to identify two streams of social movements occurred after Ahok made his statement, which then went viral after Buni Yani framed it on his Facebook account. These pre-events eventually led to the cessation of Ahok from his gubernatorial duty after the court made an official verdict of him having blasphemed the religion of Islam.

The theories used to analyze the case, namely affective intelligence theory and network theory of power, will be discussed next.

AFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE THEORY

Affective intelligence theory is a school of thought on political decision-making that widely referred to W. Russel Neuman, George E. Marcus, Michael MacKuen, and Ann N. Crigler (Neuman et al., 2007). Unlike general assumptions, affective intelligence theory rejects the notion that cognition and emotional factors in political decision-making are two different things. Instead, they support the view that “[p]olitical cognition is emotionally shaped” (Castells, 2009, p. 146). At the individual level, a political decision taken by a person can be implemented in terms of political choice in an election or articulated in

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the form of a social movement. According to Castells (2015), social movements are essential actions motivated by one’s emotional state (p.13). Thus, it is an emotion-driven movement. Two emotions that are often associated with political behavior and social movements are ‘fear’, which is negative affect, and ‘enthusiasm’, that refers to positive affect (ibid., pp.13-14).

Castells seeks to associate concepts in affective intelligence theory with various cases in social movements. According to him, socio-political movements, especially in the environment of network society, where people champion digital technology, are induced by emotions that are likely transformed into action. The dominant emotions that can move people to self-mobilize are fear and anxiety. Some examples of series of rallies in the world in the last decade that were induced by emotions and had domino effect are ‘the Arab Spring’ or ‘the Arabian revolution’, the ‘Indignadas’ movement in Spain and the Occupy Wall Street movement (see Castells, 2015).

Political actions influenced by negative and positive effects are inspired by two motivational systems that distinguish them: the approach and avoidance motivational systems. Castells bases his analysis on the work of Huddy et al. (2007) and states that “[t]he approach system is linked to goal-seeking behavior that produces positive emotions by directing an individual toward experiences and situations that produce pleasure and reward. The negative affect is linked to avoidance intended to protect an individual against negative occurrences” (2009, p. 147).

Another form of emotion closely related to fear and resulted from avoidance is anxiety. “Anxiety is a response to an external threat over which the threatened person has no control ... The overcoming of anxiety in socio-political behavior often results from another negative emotion: anger ... [which] associated with risk-taking behavior” (Castells, 2015, p. 14). On the other hand, movements triggered by enthusiasm have a dimension of hope within. Social action projected by hope orients on future action, while social action moved by fear is in general related to past-experience. According to a study of social phenomenology developed by Alfred Schutz (1972), the former is identical to in-order-to motive while the latter is associated more to because motive.

For a social movement to be formed, there are at least two preconditions to be met:

1. Individuals must connect their own experiences with others’. For this to happen, effective communication processes by using appropriate channels through which ‘cognitive consonance’ between senders and receiver messages could occur are required (Castells, 2015, p. 15). When cognitive consonance emerges and “sharing of feelings” between individuals involved in the movement arises, sense of togetherness is slowly formed from the communication process. The emergence of togetherness and solidarity in a movement is crucial in overcoming fears experienced by each individual who beforehand has nothing in common to bind them for creating collective action. It is the commonality of
feelings of being “humiliated, exploited, ignored or misrepresented” (Castells, 2015, p. 15) by the dominant force that develops ingroup spirit so that seeds of collectivity can emerge and members in turn are ready to channel their anger in the form of coordinated joint action.

**Figure 4.** The terms “hope” and “fear” are often used in political campaigns as part of a binary opposition strategy that makes it easier for people and politicians for self-identifying while pointing at opponents with negative labels. This is more of a symbolic war than referring to the true meaning of the words itself.12

2. Therefore, in the process of formation of social movements and experience synchronization among members of the movement, “the existence of a communication process that propagates the events and the emotions attached to it [is essential]”. The faster and more interactive the process of communication is, the more likely the formation of a process of collective action becomes...

(ibid.). The development of new/digital information and communication technologies that operate online enables this kind of communication process to occur. Social media provides a platform for the establishment of interactive communication patterns and the acceleration of massive information distribution processes. The form of mass communication in conventional mass media is replaced by the form of “mass self-communication” (ibid., p. 6), wherein personalized messages can be distributed to many using network power and make them “difficult to control by government or corporations” (ibid., p. 7).13

In a nutshell, what we can learn from affective intelligence theory and its relation to social movements are as follows: the mechanism of individual’s political decision-making (cognition) cannot be separated from individual’s current emotional state and/or individua’s predispositional system. Such emotions can be fear-motivated and

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12 @jeremycorbyn (2017, June 7). “In few hours that remain in #GE2017 [...], talk to your friends, your neighbours. It’s a choice, quite simply, between hope or fear #ForTheMany” [twitter post]. Retrieved June 22, 2017, from https://twitter.com/jeremycorbyn/status/872529884735819780

13 Castells (2015) defines mass self-communication, a combination of mass communication and self-communication, as follows: “It is mass communication because it processes messages from many to many, with the potential of reaching a multiplicity of receivers, and of connecting to endless networks that transmit digitized information around the world. It is self-communication because the production of the message is autonomously decided by the sender, the designation of the receiver is self-directed and the retrieval of messages from the networks of communication is self-selected.” (p. 6-7)
related to the experience in the past, i.e. ‘because-motive’ or enthusiasm, which is a projection of future action because it contains ‘in-order-to-motive’ element. Political behavior conditioned by fear can crystallize into anger, even outrage, and tendency to avoid the source of problem. As a result, it prevents individuals from negative impacts. Those who mobilize themselves and are constrained by hope-motivated emotion usually aren’t forced to move due to current situation they are in, but voluntarily act with enthusiasm in order to approach the goal they want to achieve. For collective action to take place, effective and coordinated communication processes are needed so that individuals with similar experience can connect with each other. In doing so, they can identify themselves in a network and organize themselves with a sense of togetherness and solidarity of the network. The use of internet-based digital communication with its horizontal communication structure and interactive characteristics can be crucial for enabling and accelerating this process.

**NETWORK THEORY OF POWER**

In Castells’ network theory of power (Castells, 2009, 2011, 2015), he essentially conceptualizes power (and counterpower) relationships within the framework of network society. According to him, there are four sources of power that can be found and exercised in the network: (1) networking power, (2) network power, (3) networked power, and (4) network-making power. For the purpose of this paper, only the fourth type of power, the most crucial one, will be discussed and used for analyzing Ahok’s case. Other types of power may be useful, but not the focus of this paper.

Network-making power is “the power to program specific networks according to the interests and values of the programmers, and the power to switch different networks following the strategic alliances between the dominant actors of various networks” (Castells, 2011, p. 773). Those who hold the power to program and reprogram the networks are called programmers and those who connect networks and have the ability to combine different power sources by switching networks and form strategic cooperation are labelled as switchers (ibid. p. 776; ibid., 2009, p. 45; ibid., 2015, pp. 8-9, 17). In a society whose institutions and norms are asymmetrically structured by those who control power sources – the dominants – over those who are in a subordinate position, whose role is to serve the interests and values of those holding the power position, counterpower is likely to occur from and within the civil society. It aims to reprogram power relationships within and among networks and ‘install’ alternative goals into the networks and turn networks’ functions to assist the interests and values of marginalized networks by disrupting and interrupting existing switches and replacing them with “networks of resistance and social change” (ibid., p. 9; see ibid., 2011, p. 773). The use of both mass communication and mass self-communication is decisive in the operation of power and counterpower. In order to seize power from the dominants, counterpower can also forcefully switch the nodes between strategic
networks, for example, “between the political networks and the media networks to produce and diffuse specific political-ideological discourses or the relationship between religious networks and political networks to advance a religious agenda in a secular society” (ibid., p. 777). The relationships between political networks and media networks are common in many countries whose media system allows cross ownership between political parties and media institutions. This results in bias media reports and journalist partisanship. Indonesia is one of those countries where most national media networks are owned by politicians or by those who are close to political power (Lim 2012; Armando, 2014; cf. Hallin & Mancini, 2004).

Therefore, when media networks are controlled by a few of political elites, who dominate communication channels, citizen at the grassroots level need to find ways through which they can exercise their communication activities autonomously. The Internet and wireless communication networks, with their characteristic of decentralized message production and pluralistic form of information, provide the opportunity for marginalized group within the society to overcome this communication barrier. They can “subvert the practice of communication as usual by occupying the medium and creating the message” (Castells, 2015, p. 9).

This is the task of individuals who collectively form an action in the form of social movement to reprogram the dominant networks by producing new values and norms into the networks around which the people live. Nevertheless, the occupation of cyberspace by autonomously producing bottom-up messages doesn’t guarantee that the reprogramming of networks and switching of connective points will be successful. It needs co-occupation of the public space, preferably in the urban areas, and to make the movement visible to the wider public. This hybrid occupation, both on the internet and in the public spaces, characterizes civic social movements around the world in this era of network society where the ownership and management of information capital distinguish the haves and the have nots (Castells, 2015; cf. Castells, 2010).

CASE ANALYSIS

When the plan for peaceful demonstration (Aksi Damai) raised by GNPF-MUI began to surface in October 2016, after Buni Yani’s Facebook status became viral, the public was easily split into two major groups: those who agreed with the frame constructed by Buni Yani that Ahok had committed blasphemy against the Qur’an (‘anti-Ahok’ group), and those who thought that Ahok didn’t mean to insult Islam by what he had said (the ‘pro-Ahok’ group). I will begin to analyze both

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I am aware of the arguments that anti-Ahok group did not merely mean “anti-Ahok” or “pro-Buni Yani” per se, instead, according to their claim, they had certain mission to defend Islam and defend the Ulema. So too with the “pro-Ahok” group, it did not merely defend Ahok in person, but it defended Ahok’s intended meaning of his statement that religion in general had been used and politicized against him by his political opponent and that this meaning had been single-handedly deflected by Buni Yani to support his political agenda. Further, this group also promoted multiple interpretations of Surah Al-Maidah verse 51. Here, I’m
movements by quoting Castells (2015): most of grassroots movements that counterpower vis-à-vis government were caused 

*primarily [by] the humiliation provoked by cynicism and arrogance of those in power, be it financial, political or cultural, that brought together those who turned fear into outrage, and outrage into hope for a better humanity. A humanity that had to be reconstructed from scratch, escaping multiple ideological and institutional traps that had led to dead ends again and again, forging a new path by treading it. It was the search for dignity amid the suffering of humiliation ... (p. 2-3).*

With Ahok’s non-compromise and straightforward communication style, anti-Ahok group considered him arrogant, had a bad manner and – as a person who had power – didn’t act as a leader who could control his anger in front of the public. His ethnic background, a Chinese descendant, was often scapegoated as the cause of economic disparities between social groups in Indonesia where the Chinese were touted as the small elites who control Indonesian economy and concentrated big portion of the country’s wealth among them. The Indonesian-Chinese were often criticized because of their cultural detachment from the (poor) Indonesian *pribumi* (the natives).15

Politically, those who joined GNPF-MUI coalition were also those who lost in the 2014 Presidential Election, where Gerindra and PKS were in it. Relying only on political networks, it was clear that it was very difficult to ‘destroy’ Ahok. The outcome of several open conflicts between Ahok and DPRD (provincial parliament), for instance in the case of legal battle about his inauguration as the new Governor, the UPS case, the Jakarta Bay reclamation case, and the Sumber Waras hospital case, had proven that Ahok was politically strong.

 Culturally, Ahok, who came from Bangka Belitung province with his Sumatran ideals characterized by their “hard” culture and forthright communication style, was evaluated as impolite and disrespectful to his communication partner. This is in extreme contrast to the Javanese culture that emphasizes politeness, courteousness, and gentleness; in other words, the ideal ‘east’ culture. Further, anti-Ahok group considered him of having crossed the line (often cited by the media as “over the fence”) because he dared to interpret the sacred texts of other religion’s holy book and put next to it words with negative connotation (‘fool’ and ‘deceive’ or ‘lie’). Consequently, he was considered to attack Islamic scholars who interpreted otherwise. As a non-Muslim, he was deemed as having no rights of doing such things, let alone doing it in public while travelling on official task as a governor. Ahok’s opponents spin-doctored the scandal and successfully turned the issue into the case of blasphemy of the Qur’an and even of the Muslims and Islam as a whole. This was the reason of why the supporters of *Aksi Bela Islam* felt

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entitled to claim that their movement was carried out in the name of the whole Muslim community even though many moderate Muslims disagreed with the action.

The theory of affective intelligence, as compiled in Marcus, et. al. (2007) and presented by Castells (2009) in his Communication Power theory, distinguishes political behavior by two types of emotion that trigger it: fear/anxiety/anger (negative affect) and enthusiasm/hope (positive affect). Both categories of emotion are related to two types of motivation, namely approach and avoidance. I argue that on one hand, the movement against Ahok was based primarily on the feeling of anger, i.e. anger that framed in religious defamation, that first constructed by Buni Yani through his (arguably bias) Facebook status. The arising emotion of anger is closely related to fear. At least two underlying factors can be identified for inciting this fear: politically-motivated fear of defeat in the upcoming election and religion-motivated fear of God's wrath for violating His command for not choosing a non-Muslim leader. This was an understandable reason for a country with the most populous Muslim in the world and where religion was considered as influential in daily life.

The effect of this emotion-motivated political action multiplied as anti-Ahok groups were systematically reproducing fear in various occasions and on so many levels. In social media, particularly on twitter and Facebook, Buni Yani’s status was posted repeatedly with that same exact frame. Offline, mosques became effective political campaign spaces wrapped in and blurred with religious speeches because they could voice the unrest feeling of Muslims who were in agreement with Buni Yani’s opinion. There was strong indication that mosques had been politicized. In a video clip that went viral prior to the 2017 Jakarta election, Eep Syefullah Fatah, who

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was acting as Anies-Sandi political adviser during that election rounds, recommended to use mosques as a campaign axis to defeat Ahok. Consequently, during the election period, people often complained about Friday sermons fulfilled with biased political themes.

On the other hand, those who supported Ahok had an expectation of a better Jakarta because they had seen and experienced many good results of his work as a governor, which was considered much better than the works of previous administrations. Enthusiasm of supports were given not due to fear of something transcendental, but the hope of a more organized and modern Jakarta where people from diverse background can coexist and tolerate each other. This group consists of people from diverse background. There was no single group within this movement that acted as organizer. Mobilization and initiatives were organized sporadically by different actors, sometimes by prominent persons (public figure/celebrities such as Addie MS or popular rock band Slank) or by Teman Ahok – a group of volunteers supporting Ahok for the election. Instead of avoiding Ahok, this group, backed informally by some mainstream media such as Metro TV and Kompas, were approaching him.

However, with another reading into this case, we can twist the analysis that will lead to a rather contrasting outcome to what has been described above. Based on Castells’ (2009) explanation that “acting on behavioral predispositions should trigger enthusiasm …” (p. 147), we expect that anti-Ahok movement, which was fear-motivated, could not have acted based on behavioral predispositions, but on anxiety. In contrast to this, anti-Ahok movement had already had a tendency towards rejecting non-Muslim candidate as their “leader”. Instead of enthusiasm, this bias predisposition had triggered feeling of fear within the Muslim community who followed the movement. Furthermore, different from what the theory expects that “Enthusiastic citizens follow the party line …” (ibid.), there was strong indication that many of anti-Ahok movement followers were sympathizers – if not members – of the old KMP Coalition, in which PKS and Gerindra were strongly linked.

Nevertheless, if we take a closer look into the movement itself, one can also say that instead of anxious, they were enthusiastic citizens who voluntarily joined the rallies and were hopeful. They hoped for different policy and ideology in Jakarta, different approach in managing the resources and solving problems, and particularly for different personnel, preferably a Muslim (a must according to their interpretation of Surah Al-Maidah Verse 51), to govern the city. A better

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(Priyadharma)

society, they would claim, should be society based on Islamic teachings. In this case, Islam and politics cannot be separated. Besides toppling down Ahok, the movement strived for a single interpretation of Islam, a mono-Islam, and used it to force meaning upon Ahok’s speech\(^\text{23}\).

In order to seize power from the ruling group, counterpower can also forcefully switch the nodes between strategic networks, for example, “between the political networks and the media networks to produce and diffuse specific political-ideological discourses or the relationship between religious networks and political networks to advance a religious agenda in a secular society” (ibid., p. 777). In this case, the persistence of anti-Ahok groups in suppressing state apparatuses (the police, the prosecutor and the court) to prosecute and arrest Ahok indicated the power of network-switching. Religious networks were used to influence the legal system/networks. Mass mobilizations were to be seen each time Ahok’s trial took place (broadcasted live by national television networks). Ahok’s defamation case that – in a democratic country – should be resolved through legal mechanism was forced to be religiously resolved with a single interpretation of the Quran. The fatwa issued by MUI as well as mass mobilization on the streets before the court became a strong tendency of this premise. There was clearly a feeling of distrust of the judicial system, suspicious over the process of judiciary, distrust of the mainstream media accused for their bias reports, and even distrust of the government. Slogans such as “down with Jokowi” was obvious in the first day of demonstrations\(^\text{24}\).

The strong affiliation of anti-Ahok groups with one pair candidate (Anies-Sandi)\(^\text{25}\) strengthened the hypothesis that – albeit denial – there was indeed political agenda behind the rallies and the pressure on Ahok and the state. It was obvious that there were strong efforts to switch public agenda from religious-based issue (defamation of Islam) to an issue that should be resolved through political networks (governor election and/or the participation of some party members opposed to Ahok in the demonstrations) or legal networks (if political system could not resolve the case). Furthermore, the fact that many religious leaders had preached/campaigned against Ahok by citing Surah Al-Maidah verse 51 and called Muslim not to vote for a non-Muslim candidate as a leader in a Muslim majority society


\(^{25}\text{Ibid.}\)
(considered as *haram*) indicated a strong push of religious agenda into the outcome of political system. This switching-network mechanism making it difficult for people to distinguish whether it was a political, religious, or law case. The boundary of each network became even more blurred as time went on.

In regard to anti-Ahok movement’s mission to reprogram the networks, there were signs that this group would try to lay Islamic foundation of Jakarta’s policy by supporting Anies-Sandi in the last governor election (such as Muslim leader/head of government institution for the Muslim majority). This agenda would be against Pancasila that functions as the basic ideology of the state that protects and gives all religions equal rights to perform in the political arena and practice their beliefs. It remains to be seen whether this verdict is about to happen or not as Anies-Sandi will take over the Governor/Vice-Governor post in October 2017.

Additionally, I argue that the willingness of the participants of anti-Ahok rallies to march voluntarily in such a huge number was due to the single framing of Buni Yani who partly quoted (hence missing the context) and mistranslated Ahok’s speech. The only framing he consciously or unconsciously constructed was “blasphemy of Islam” that was propagated on his Facebook’s status update. This frame, which omitted some of Ahok’s statements in the translation and gave specific meaning to it, successfully limited diverse interpretations (tafsir) of the verse into one single version (mono-interpretation/mono-Islam). The frame touched the emotions of many Indonesian Muslims because it successfully put them into the subject of the case and encouraged them to go down the street and form collective actions. In a network society that relies on the use new ICTs, especially the Internet, as a means of information dissemination and networks-making, technology is used to construct meaning over a phenomenon. However, once Yani’s Facebook status went viral, he lost control over his own framing and the distribution of the message so that it became a “wild ball” played around by many players that was difficult to be controlled by a single person.

The power to (re)program and switch network is one of four types of power in a network society as argued by Castells in his network theory of power. Yani’s framing, massive fear-motivated movements, internet-based mass mobilization and message circulation, and the strong affiliation of religious networks with political networks were proven to be decisive in ending Ahok’s domination in Jakarta.

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26 The rumors of Jakarta Syariah agenda/program had been denied by Anies-Sandi despite the fact that they won because they played the religion game. This is an indication of political Islam. See *Ketika Anies-Sandi menang dengan kekuatan Islam* [http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-39644574](http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-39644574)

27 There was a strong indication that Buni Yani spin-doctored the issue as some of his tweets from 2012 were leaked to the public. It revealed his awareness of religion as a marketing tool. See, for example, blog post from Erika Ebener on Seward (opinion website) on May 5, 2017: [https://seword.com/politik/buni-yani-bermain-api-agama-mash-bagus-tuhan-tidak-melaknat-dia/](https://seword.com/politik/buni-yani-bermain-api-agama-mash-bagus-tuhan-tidak-melaknat-dia/)
CONCLUSION

Referring to Affective Intelligence Theory, this paper has detected that both movements, whether anti-Ahok movement driven by GNPF-MUI or the more plural pro-Ahok movement, had elements of fear and enthusiasm within that fueled their actions. The series of Islamists’ mass movements, which were incited by Ahok’s statement in which a Quranic verse was quoted and then fired up by Buni Yani’s online political spin-doctoring, were more conditioned by their anger towards Ahok’s behavior and attitude rather than his achievements. Ahok’s devotion to Christianity, which was categorized as kafir (infidel) by anti-Ahok supporters, further complicated his position. For them, standing behind a kafir is considered equivalent to breaking God’s command. That was the kind of fear that became the foundation of anti-Ahok movement. On the contrary, the pro-Ahok movement based its fear on the increasing potential of widespread discrimination of minority groups in Indonesia. Ahok’s supporters were worried if intolerant groups (i.e. the Islamic radical mass organizations behind GNPF-MUI such as the FPI) gained more power and seized strategic positions in various networks that could control power relations in this country.

The enthusiasm of pro-Ahok movement was motivated more by Ahok’s achievement in Jakarta. His uncompromising approach for transforming old-fashioned bureaucratic practices that caused inefficiency made him famous for his strict anti-corruption policy. For anti-Ahok groups, enthusiasm arouse due to the opportunity to replace a non-Muslim leader as soon as possible. By switching networks (referring to Castells’ Network Theory of Power) between political, religious, and eventually legal networks, Ahok, who under normal conditions would have maintained his position because of his popularity and breakthroughs, could be forced to step down from his governor seat before his term ended.

However, one thing to be observed in post-Ahok Jakarta is whether anti-Ahok groups that win the 2017 election will reprogram the networks by installing new goals into the networks. If so, we still need to be critical of the political, policy, and polity changes that can consequently affect the fulfillment of human rights for minority groups in Indonesia, a country founded on pluralistic idealism or Kebhinnekaan that was conceptualized by founding fathers and stated in the 1945 Indonesian Constitution and Pancasila ideology.

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